tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3556891643907669554.post5115113394083191216..comments2024-01-23T11:05:07.492-06:00Comments on MSU PHILOSOPHY CLUB: Possible Worlds III - ActualismUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3556891643907669554.post-46159669078317721402008-11-12T19:07:00.000-06:002008-11-12T19:07:00.000-06:00It is sound in the possible world in which the pre...It is sound <I>in the possible world in which the premises are true</I>.<BR/><BR/>Soundness is relative to particular possible worlds, as truth is.<BR/><BR/>The proposition "All animals can fly" certainly seems to be a member of a complete consistent set of sentences, so yes, Adams would would grant that there is such a possible world.<BR/><BR/>As to how sharply the line is drawn... I would have to look more carefully at Adams work to see, not something I've done in years.Hannohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14050924893865965576noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3556891643907669554.post-11244821002885772992008-11-12T16:50:00.000-06:002008-11-12T16:50:00.000-06:00HThat was a confusing jumble (mea culpa), but I me...H<BR/><BR/>That was a confusing jumble (mea culpa), but I mean something like this:<BR/><BR/>1. All animals which have wings can fly.<BR/>2. Pigs have wings.<BR/>3. Pigs can fly.<BR/><BR/>It's valid, but it's unsound. However, if we just posit a possible world in which 1 and 2 actually are the case then it becomes sound. So would Adams let me make the proposition, "pigs can fly"? Is this sort of logic game lingering behind his concept of modality? If so, then it seems like anything I can construct, which is valid, will also become sound, given an appropriate possible world.<BR/><BR/>Did that make more sense? I prefer pigs to penguins, just because I think the mental image is more amusing.<BR/><BR/>Also, how sharply is the line drawn between Adams and the empiricists (Hume, Quine, etc., which you listed)? It seems like you could play a lot of such games, which would then find Adams and the empiricists in agreement. Where would they differ, and why? Can you give me an example?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3556891643907669554.post-40568282603424276432008-11-12T12:15:00.000-06:002008-11-12T12:15:00.000-06:00Civis: Howdy and welcome. Lewis is David Lewis. ...Civis: Howdy and welcome. Lewis is David Lewis. See the earlier posts on Possible Worlds.<BR/><BR/>ce: Possibility is for Adams irreducible, so you cannot analyze it further. But given that, you can construct a possible worlds semantics for our language.<BR/><BR/>For Adams, it is possible for Aristotle to have been a goat farmer because "Aristotle is a goat farmer" is a proposition that that is contained in a complete consistent set of propositions.<BR/><BR/>And no, that is not proper logic-speak, so I'm not sure what you have in mind.Hannohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14050924893865965576noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3556891643907669554.post-42710956900936546602008-11-12T11:25:00.000-06:002008-11-12T11:25:00.000-06:00What "Lewis" are you referring to?What "Lewis" are you referring to?Civishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17949434514799433103noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3556891643907669554.post-50692727508896875372008-11-12T10:03:00.000-06:002008-11-12T10:03:00.000-06:00A proposition like "Aristotle is tall" contains bo...<I>A proposition like "Aristotle is tall" contains both the individual Aristotle and the property of being tall. Consistency in complete sets of propositions is inherently modal: It is consistent if it is possible to be true together.</I><BR/><BR/>But for Adams, what does possible entail? Is it "possible" that Aristotle was a goat farmer? It's not true, so far as I am aware, but modal claims need not be consistent with things precisely as they are (or were) in <B>this</B> world. Can we attach properties that are not consistent with this world, but would be perfectly consistent given a different state of affairs in a possible world? If I'm putting this in proper logic-speak: if I put forth a valid proposition, given that it is in possible world X, does it automatically become sound?<BR/><BR/><I>Just as there are truths about Superman, fiction can ground truth.</I><BR/><BR/>Finally, someone who makes sense. Bravo Armstrong. Bravo, indeed.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com